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Abstract 
 
People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. 
Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences 
in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) 
and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have 
been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Study 1, 2, 5), 
need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus 
analytic thinking (Study 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but 
there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These 
results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive 
ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style. 
 
Keywords: Illusory truth effect; Analytic thinking; Intuition; Cognitive Ability; Need for 
Cognitive Closure; Reasoning 
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Introduction 
Throughout human history, communicators, including politicians and public 
influencers, have often deliberately repeated assertions to make them more believable 
(Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Hoffrage, 1997). Although this strategy was already applied long 
before the birth of the field of psychology, psychological research has provided strong 
evidence that people tend to believe information more if it has been previously encountered. 
In their seminal work on this so-called ‘illusory truth effect’, Hasher, Goldstein and Toppino’s 
(1977) participants rated the truth of various trivia statements. On three successive occasions 
with two weeks intervals, this task was repeated with a list of statements consisting of both 
repeated (i.e., present at the first rating) and new statements. Over time, statements that were 
repeated were more likely to be considered true compared to new statements. Since Hasher 
and colleagues’ original experiment, numerous studies have replicated the illusory truth effect 
(see the quantitative meta-analysis by Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010). 
The most widely accepted explanation of the illusory truth effect relies on processing 
fluency (Dechêne et al., 2010; Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2013), referring to the meta-
cognitive experience of the ease with which people process information (see Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009). Repeated statements are processed more fluently, and this experience of 
fluency in turn is used as a cue to infer validity (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992; Unkelbach, 
2007). In their overview, Alter and Oppenheimer (2009), provided evidence that different 
variations of fluency manipulations have similar effects on human judgment. Accordingly, 
besides repetition, different manipulations of fluency, such as conceptual fluency (e.g. 
semantic priming; Kelley & Lindsay 1993), perceptual fluency (e.g. contrast; Reber & 
Schwarz, 1999) and linguistic fluency (e.g. rhyming; McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000) also 
evoke the tendency to judge information as being true. In addition, by demonstrating that the 
perirhinal cortex, which is associated with fluency, showed increased activity with truth 
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ratings for repeated, but not for new, statements, Wang, Brashier, Wing, Marsh, and Cabeza 
(2016) provided neurological evidence for the role of processing fluency on the illusory truth 
effect. 
Compatible with this dominant processing fluency explanation, Unkelbach and Rom 
(2017) recently introduced a referential theory to further explain the illusory truth effect. The 
theory holds that, when an individual processes information (e.g. Van Gogh painted Starry 
Night in Saint-Rèmy), the corresponding references that provide meaning to the different 
elements (e.g. Van Gogh; Starry Night; Saint-Rèmy), and their coherence constitute a 
localized information network in memory. According to this perspective, the judged truth of a 
particular statement is informed by both the availability of these corresponding references and 
their coherence. Confronted with the task to judge the validity of certain statements, repeated 
statements have, according to this account, already formed more coherently linked 
corresponding references due to prior processing, and have consequently a higher probability 
to be judged as true compared to new statements. 
Given the intellectual capabilities of the human mind, the observation that exposure to 
information enhances the subjective truth of that information is striking. Not surprisingly, the 
illusory truth effect and its underlying mechanisms have received a lot of research attention 
(Dechêne et al., 2010). However, it remains unclear whether this effect is moderated by 
individual differences. As argued by Underwood (1975), the incorporation of an individual 
differences perspective advances psychological theorizing. Indeed, understanding which 
variables are, and which are not related to the illusory truth effect will deepen our 
understanding on this important phenomenon. Here, we investigate the influence of three 
variables on repetition-induced truth that have already demonstrated their substantial impact 
on human judgment and decision making in other domains: cognitive ability (cf. intelligence), 
need for cognitive closure, and cognitive styles. 
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Cognitive Ability 
According to both the referential theory and fluency explanation of the illusory truth 
effect, it is essential that the presented information is appropriately processed when it is first 
encountered, otherwise a localized information network will not emerge in memory, and the 
information will not be processed more fluently at the second encounter. In one of their 
experiments, Unkelbach and Rom (2017; Study 3) provided evidence for the role of encoding 
depth, by showing that experimental manipulations of encoding depth are positively related to 
the effect size of the illusory truth effect. Consequently, one might expect that individual 
differences in information processing capacity, which presumably facilitate encoding depth, 
are therefore also positively related to the illusory truth effect. There is consensus that 
information processing operates through the individual’s working memory (see e.g., 
Anderson, 1996; Hunt, 2011), which is highly positively related to general intelligence 
(Conway, Jarrold, Kane, Miyake, & Towse, 2007; Kyllonen, 1996). In addition to adequately 
processing information, it is also essential that no information gets lost; that is, that memory 
remains intact over time (Unkelbach & Rom, 2017, see also Garcia-Marques, Silva, Reber, & 
Unkelbach, 2015). In their delineation of the illusory truth effect, Dechêne et al. (2010, p. 
239) argued: ‘By definition, the repetition-based truth effect is mediated by memory 
processes’. Similar to information processing capacity, the ability to maintain information in 
memory and fluently use it later in the process of thinking, is highly associated with general 
intelligence (see e.g. McGrew, 2005). Building on this research, one might expect that general 
cognitive ability (i.e. intelligence) should be positively related to the illusory truth effect. 
Need for Cognitive Closure 
Whereas cognitive ability may be associated with the ability to form coherently linked 
corresponding references in memory when first encountered, and subsequently processing 
information more fluently when encountered again later on, the individual’s need for 
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cognitive closure (NFC) may be associated with the motivation to use this information in the 
decision process. The NFC concept derives from Kruglanski’s (1980) theory of lay 
epistemology, and is defined as individuals’ desire for firm answers to questions, and aversion 
toward ambiguity (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). The motivation to obtain epistemic security 
plays an important role in knowledge formation and judgments processes (for an overview see 
Roets, Kruglanski, Kossowska, Pierro, & Hong, 2015). Although situational forces such as 
fatigue can temporally impact the NFC, individuals show reliable differences in their 
dispositional NFC levels (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; Roets & Van Hiel, 2007). In cases 
where closure is lacking, people high in dispositional NFC show elevated levels of both 
physiological and self-reported distress (Roets & Van Hiel, 2008). Theoretically, NFC instills 
the tendency to seize quickly on information that promises closure, and to freeze on acquired 
knowledge (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). To resolve the need for closure, individuals high in 
NFC often use heuristics, simple cues, and readily available information (Roets et al., 2015). 
As such, confronted with the question whether a statement is true or false, individuals high in 
NFC may be more sensitive to elevations in the strength of coherent corresponding references 
and the accompanied processing fluency experience due to prior exposure, to obtain quick 
answers and epistemic security versus remaining in a state of uncertainty.  
Cognitive style 
 Besides cognitive ability and need for epistemic security, the way in which individuals 
tend to engage in problem-solving and decision-making – that is, their cognitive style – might 
also be related to the susceptibility of the illusory truth effect. Various dual-process theories 
have been proposed in which it is argued that there are two different types of information 
processing (e.g. Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2011; for overviews, see Evans, 2008; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013): ‘intuitive or experiential’ thinking (often referred as Type 1) and ‘rational 
or analytic’ (often referred as Type 2) thinking. Intuitive thinking is associated with 
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automatic, heuristic, rapid, and associative processing, whereas analytic thinking is associated 
with extensive, deliberative and relatively slow processing (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, 
Kahneman, 2011). Theoretically, responses are the result of a combination of these 
independent and interacting types of processing. Importantly, individuals show reliable 
individual differences in the use of these types of thinking (e.g., Pacini & Epstein, 1999; 
Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2016). Although intuitive thinking might often result in 
satisfactory responses, it is also prone to cognitive biases and non-optimal responses (see, 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Pretz, 2008). Dechêne and colleagues (2010) hypothesized that the 
truth effect might be more pronounced for individuals with a more intuitive style of thinking. 
Indeed, individuals with an intuitive style of thinking rely more on their automatically 
activated experiences in judgement formation, and may therefore be more inclined to use the 
metacognitive experience of fluency as a cue for the truthfulness of a given statement. 
Individuals high in analytic thinking, however, tend to critically evaluate their initial 
responses that are associated with metacognitive feelings of rightness (Pennycook, Cheyne, 
Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015a) and are less 
prone to overconfidence (Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2017). Thus, increased 
analysis from relatively analytic people may make it less likely for them to judge repeated 
statements as true.  
The Robustness of the Illusory Truth Effect 
Although one may reasonably expect individual differences in cognitive ability, NFC, 
and cognitive styles to be related to the illusory truth effect based on the theoretical rationale 
presented above, there is also a theoretical argument to advance that the illusory truth effect 
should be relatively universal, and invariant to these key individual differences in human 
judgment and decision making.  
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The illusory truth effect relies on memory processes. However, many learning and 
memory theories differentiate between conscious or explicit, and unconscious or implicit 
learning and memory (e.g. Schacter, 1987; Reber, 1989). Although recent findings 
demonstrate that there are reliable differences in implicit learning, these differences are less 
related to cognitive ability compared to explicit learning (Kaufman, DeYoung, Gray, Jiménez, 
Brown, & Mackintosh, 2010). Importantly, Hasher and Zacks (1984), provided evidence that 
information about the frequency of occurrence of items and events is automatically and 
unconsciously encoded and stored into memory. Moreover, the illusory truth effect also 
occurs without explicit memory for the statements (Begg et al., 1992; Pennycook, Cannon, & 
Rand, 2018), suggesting that the effect can occur independent of conscious memory.  
Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the elderly, despite age-related declines in 
the efficiency of analytic and controlled processing mechanisms associated with deliberation, 
such as explicit learning and memory (Peters, Hess, Västfjäl, & Auman, 2007), are equally 
prone as the young to the illusory truth effect (Dechêne et al. 2010). This suggests that 
cognitive control might have little impact on the illusory truth effect. The work of Pennycook 
and colleagues (2018) also suggest that the illusory truth effect might operate relatively 
outside cognitive control. In particular, individuals have a strong motivation to reject stories 
that conflict with one’s political ideology. Nevertheless, these authors found that the 
magnitude of the illusory truth effect did not significantly differ between political discordant 
statements and political concordant statements.  
Moreover, the illusory truth effect also emerges in situations wherein individuals have 
actual knowledge about the truthfulness of the statements. Indeed, Fazio, Brashier, Payne, and 
Marsh (2015) showed that the individuals often fail to rely on stored, correct knowledge when 
judging repeated statements. Furthermore, even when people are explicitly informed about the 
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correct answer (“true”/”false”) at the time of judgment, repeated statements are more likely to 
be judged as true (Unkelbach & Greifeneder, 2018).  
In sum, there is convergent evidence for the illusory truth effect’s robustness, which 
seems to suggest that the effect is a relatively general cognitive process, and may thus be 
unaffected by cognitive ability, epistemic needs, or cognitive thinking styles. The present 
research aims to answer whether or not the illusory truth effect is influenced by these key 
individual differences in cognition. 
The present research 
We present seven studies including a combination of individual difference measures 
that have been established in the literature as being especially impactful on human judgment 
and decision making, and that have a convincing theoretical base as potential moderators of 
the repetition-based truth effect.  
Study 1 examined whether the illusory truth effect was related to fluid intelligence, 
NFC, and experiential and rational processing styles. Study 2 examined the relationship 
between the illusory truth effect and cognitive ability, using a measure of verbal intelligence. 
Both Study 3 and Study 4 focused on the relationship between cognitive style and the illusory 
truth effect, by using two different measures of individual differences in experiential and 
rational thinking. In Study 5, in addition to cognitive ability, we included a performance based 
measure of processing style, as self-report measures and objective tasks tapping into the same 
cognitive constructs might differ in the size of their relationship with a third construct (Van 
Hiel, Onraet, Crowson, & Roets, 2016), or in some cases can even show reversed effects (De 
keersmaecker, Onraet, Lepouttre, & Roets, 2017). Therefore, Study 5 used the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), which measures individual differences in the 
disposition, and ability to override intuition. In Study 6, we included both the CRT and a self-
report measures of cognitive style. Finally, in Study 7, we used an existing dataset 
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(Pennycook et al., 2018) to examine whether individuals who are inclined and able to override 
their intuition via analytic processing (measured through the CRT) are less prone to the 
illusory truth effect for information that is more societally relevant (i.e., politically charged 
news headlines)1. 
The present studies were conducted independently by four different research labs. 
First, we describe the sample, procedure and used materials for each study. Thereafter, we 
provide a combined results section, including frequentist and Bayesian meta-analysis on the 
obtained effects between individual difference measures and the illusory truth.  
Method 
Participants  
 Sample characteristics are shown in Table 1. In Study 1, undergraduate psychology 
students participated in return for partial course credit. In study 2 – 7, Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (Mturk) workers participated in return for a financial compensation. In all studies, the 
final sample size included at least 199 participants, providing > 80% power to detect effects 
of r = .20. 
Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
  N final N age %women - %men source 
Study 1 216 207 18.84 (3.40) 79.7% - 20.3% Lab 
Study 2 200 200 38.88 (12.15) 48.5%- 51.0% Mturk 
Study 3 305 300 35.95 (11.02) 53.3% - 46.7% Mturk 
Study 4 235 231 34.59 (10.89) 40.3% - 59.7% Mturk 
Study 5 199 199 36.21 (10.75) 44.7% - 55.3% Mturk 
Study 6 352 336 40.18 (12.36) 50.9% - 49.1% Mturk 
Study 7 992 723 36.76 (12.22) 55.3% - 44.0% Mturk 
Note: One participant in Study 2 indicated X as gender. Five participants did not indicate their 
gender in Study 7. Part of the data of Study 7 was previously used in Pennycook et al. (2018). 
  
Participant exclusions.  
                                                          
1Study 2 and Study 5 were conducted while the manuscript was under first review, and were 
added in the revised version. 
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Study 1 consisted of two lab sessions. Nine participants who participated in the first 
experimental session did not show up in the second session. In Study 3 and Study 4, there 
were respectively 5 and 4 participants excluded from the analyses because they indicated at 
the end of the experiment that one should not use their data; that is, they responded to the 
question: “If you were the researcher running this study, would you include your data in data 
analysis or should it be excluded due to you having been too distracted or inattentive? (Again, 
this does not affect your compensation, it just helps us analyze the data)” with “No”. In Study 
6, 16 participants were excluded from the analyses because they failed to correctly answer the 
control questions (see procedure and materials Study 6). Finally, in Study 7, participants were 
removed for reported responding randomly (N = 29), skipping over the familiarization phase 
(N = 1), searching online for information (N = 22), or prior familiarity with stimulus material 
(N = 217, see procedure and materials Study 7). 
Procedure and Materials 
 All studies were designed to examine the between-items criterion of the illusory truth 
effect, i.e. the comparison of truth judgements between repeated and new information (see 
Dechêne et al. 2010). In Study 1 – 6, the truth effect was measured using trivia statements, 
selected from Unkelbach and Rom (2017; e.g. ‘Othello was the last opera of Verdi’). In Study 
7, the truth effect was measured using political news headlines. Data of Study 1 – 6 is 
available at https://osf.io/xbwmh/. Data of Study 7 is available at https://osf.io/txf46/. 
Procedure and materials Study 1. 
Study 1 was conducted in the laboratory as part of a mass testing. Sessions included 35 
to 40 participants under supervision of three research assistants. Participants participated in 
two experimental sessions, with an intersession interval of five to seven days. In the first 
session, participants first completed a cognitive ability (i.e. intelligence) test. In this test, a 
shortened version of the Wilde Intelligence Test, (Wilde Intelligence Test; see Kersting, 
12 
 
Althoff, & Jäger, 2008), participants are presented with 45 problems assessing fluid 
intelligence. In particular, the problems tap into the abilities of general deductive reasoning, 
spatial reasoning, numeric reasoning, and perceptual speed. Participants are instructed to 
solve as many problems as they can in 12 minutes. This brief version has previously been 
used by De keersmaecker et al. (2017). Next, the 15-item NFC scale (Roets & Van Hiel 2011) 
was administered on 6-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). A 
sample item is: ‘I don’t like situations that are uncertain’. Subsequently, participants were told 
that they participated in a study examining the affective responses on reading complex 
statements. Participants were informed that they would be presented with a series of trivia 
statements. The instructions stated, in underlined typography, that some of the statements 
were correct, and some of the statements were incorrect. Participants were instructed to just 
read the statements, which were presented one by one, and participants controlled the 
presentation time. After reading all the statements (20 statements; 10 correct statements, 10 
incorrect statements), they were asked to complete a questionnaire that measures their affect 
(i.e., The PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
Five to seven days later, in a second session, participants responded to Pacini and 
Epstein’s (1999) measures of Rational (10 items) and Experiential (10 items) thinking (REI) 
on 7-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).2 Sample items for rational 
and experiential thinking are ‘I enjoy intellectual challenges’ and ‘I like to rely on my 
intuitive impressions’, respectively. Next, participants saw 20 statements and were asked to 
indicate whether the statements were correct or incorrect (coded: false = 0, true = 1). The 
statements consisted of (in random order) 5 correct new statements, 5 incorrect new 
statements, 5 correct repeated statements, and 5 incorrect repeated statements. Repeated and 
                                                          
2Based on the factor loadings of Pacini and Epstein (1999), the 5 most indicative items of 
Rational ability, Rational engagement, Experiential ability and Experiential Engagement were 
selected. 
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new statements were counterbalanced between participants, to eliminate a potential effect of 
the statements’ content.  
 Procedure and materials Study 2. 
Similar to Study 1, participants were told that the study examined how individuals 
emotionally respond to reading complex statements. After completing demographic questions, 
participants were presented with a series of 20 statements (10 correct statements, 10 incorrect 
statements), and completed the PANAS. Again, it was explicitly stated that the list contained 
both correct and incorrect statements. Next, as a measure of (verbal) cognitive ability, 
participants completed the Ammons Quick Test (QT; Ammons & Ammons, 1962). In this 
test, participants are presented with 4 pictures, and 50 words. Participants are instructed to 
connect each of the 50 words to one of the 4 pictures. Finally, participants judged the 
correctness (coded: false = 0, true = 1) of 20 statements (in random order: 5 correct new 
statements, 5 incorrect new statements, 5 correct repeated statements, and 5 incorrect repeated 
statements. Repeated and new statements were counterbalanced between participants.  
Procedure and materials Study 3. 
The experiment consisted of three consecutive phases. First, participants read 60 
statements (30 correct statements, 30 incorrect statements). Second, participants judged the 
truthfulness of 120 statements (in random order: 30 correct new statements, 30 incorrect new 
statements, 30 correct repeated statements, and 30 incorrect repeated statements. Repeated 
and new statements were counterbalanced between participants) on a 7-point scales (1 = 
certainly false, 7 = certainly true). Finally, participants answered Pacini and Epstein’s (1999) 
40-item REI, and Betsch’s (2004) 18-item preference for intuition and deliberation scale 
(PID) on 5-point Likert scales (1 = “completely false”, 5 = “completely true”). Sample items 
for intuition and deliberation are ‘My feelings play an important role in my decisions’ and 
‘Before making decisions, I first think them through’, respectively. 
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 Procedure and materials Study 4. 
Procedure and materials of Study 4 were similar to Study 3. After reading 30 
statements (15 correct statements, 15 incorrect statements), participants judged the 
truthfulness of 60 statements (in random order: 15 correct new statements, 15 incorrect new 
statements, 15 correct repeated statements, and 15 incorrect repeated statements) 
dichotomously (coded: false = 0, true = 1). Repeated and new statements were 
counterbalanced between participants. Finally, participants completed the REI and the PID. 
Procedure and materials Study 5. 
 The procedure and materials of Study 5 were similar to Study 2, with the addition of 
Toplak, West, and Stanovich’s extended CRT (7 items). The CRT is a performance-based test 
of cognitive reflection that shows moderate associations with self-report measures of rational 
thinking and experiential thinking (Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016). Low 
scores on the test have been demonstrated to relate to the use of heuristics, and cognitive 
biases, above and beyond cognitive ability (Toplak, West, Stanovich, 2011). 
Procedure and materials Study 6 
Similar to Study 1, 2, and 5 participants, participants read that the aim of the study was 
to examine emotional responses to reading a series of correct and incorrect complex 
statements. To safeguard data quality, after the presentation phase (20 statements: 10 correct 
statements, 10 incorrect statements), participants were presented with four statements (1 new 
and correct, 1 repeated and correct, 1 new and incorrect, 1 repeated and incorrect), and were 
asked to indicate for each statement whether or not it had been presented to them in the 
previous phase of the experiment. Participants who failed to score above chance level, were 
omitted from the sample (N = 16). These control question statements were not used in the test 
phase. Subsequently, participants completed the PANAS. Thereafter, participants completed 
the 20-item version of the REI that was used in Study 1, and Frederick’s (2005) CRT (3 
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items). Finally, participants judged the correctness (coded: false = 0, true = 1) of 20 
statements (in random order: 5 correct new statements, 5 incorrect new statements, 5 correct 
repeated statements, and 5 incorrect repeated statements. Repeated and new statements were 
counterbalanced between participants), and responded to demographic questions.  
Procedure and materials Study 7. 
Study 7 made use of an existing dataset (via Pennycook et al. 2018). Below we only 
describe the variables and manipulations that are relevant for the present purposes. An 
elaborate description of the full procedure can be found in Pennycook et al. (2018). Materials 
consisted of 16 news headlines; half of which were accurate (real news) and half of which 
were inaccurate (fake news). The headlines were all political in nature and were pretested to 
be either ‘Democrat-consistent’ or ‘Republican-consistent’. Headlines as presented to 
participants can be found on the OSF page of the study.  
Prior exposure was manipulated using a 3-stage experiment. In the familiarization 
stage, participants were shown four fake and four real news headlines, half of which were 
Democrat-consistent and half of which were Republican-consistent. Participants were asked 
to indicate whether they had seen or heard about the stories before in order to isolate the 
analyses on items that were novel. Next, participants advanced to the distractor stage, in 
which they completed a set of filler demographic questions and the Positive and Negative 
Affective Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). In the third “assessment” stage, 
participants were presented with 16 news headlines (8 repeated headlines, 8 new headlines) 
and rated each for accuracy on 4 point Likert scales (1= not at all accurate; 4 = very accurate). 
Headlines were counterbalanced across participants and balanced with regard to political 
consistency. Following the assessment stage, participants were asked to indicate their prior 
familiarity (before the experiment) with the headlines that were not presented in the 
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familiarization stage. This was done so that we could determine which news headlines people 
were exposed to prior to the experiment.  
Participants then completed a reworded version of the original Frederick (2005) CRT 
(via Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012) and the 4-item non-numeric CRT from Thomson and 
Oppenheimer (2016). The two versions were significantly correlated, r(938) = .53, and were 
combined into a single reliable scale of seven items. At the end, participants were asked about 
random responding, use of search engines, and whether they skipped through the 
familiarization stage. 
Results 
Illusory truth effect 
 Table 2 shows the differences between repeated and new statements in all 7 studies; 
this difference was highly significant in all studies: participants judged repeated information 
more often as true compared to new information. Effect size d was calculated with Dunlop, 
Cortina, Vaslow and Burke’s (1996) formula that takes into account the correlation between 
dependent variables in repeated measurement designs, d = tc [2(1 – r)/n]1/2 where tc is the t-
statistic for correlated observations and r is the correlation between judgments of repeated and 
new information.  
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Table 2. Mean truth ratings for repeated information, new information, difference score 
between new and repeated information with Standard Deviation (SD) and range, t statistic for 
correlated observations and degrees of freedom (df), level of significance, and d for the 
illusory truth effect in Study 1-7. 
 Repeated 
info 
New 
Info 
Diff (SD) 
[Range] 
tc 
(df) 
p < d 
Study 1 0.64 0.42 
0.22 (0.29) 
[-0.70; 0.80] 
10.67  
(206) 
.001 1.15 
Study 2 0.66 0.57 
0.10 (0.28) 
[-0.50; 0.80] 
4.88 
(199) 
.001 0.45 
Study 3 3.84 3.58 
0.26 (0.31) 
[-0.60; 1.33] 
14.73 
(299) 
.001 0.58 
Study 4 0.57 0.45 
0.12 (0.22) 
[-0.33; 0.73] 
8.55  
(230) 
.001 0.61 
Study 5 0.72 0.56 
0.16 (0.29) 
[-0.60; 0.80] 
7.59 
(198) 
.001 0.77 
Study 6 0.69 0.47 
0.22 (0.35) 
[-0.60; 1.00] 
11.62  
(335) 
.001 0.99 
Study 7 2.01 1.92 
0.09 (.48) 
[-1.50; 1.92] 
4.78  
(722) 
.001 0.17 
Note: In study 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, truth judgments were made dichotomously (coded 0 = false; 1 
= true). In study 3 and Study 7, truth judgments were made on Likert scales (coded 1 = 
certainly false; 7 = certainly true, and 1= not at all accurate; 4 = very accurate, 
respectively).  
 
Illusory truth effect – individual differences 
Preliminary analyses.  
Table 3 shows that the measures of the individual difference variables are reliable, and 
show meaningful intercorrelations, which provides convergent validity of the measures. In 
particular, REI’s measure of experiential thinking was strongly related to PID’s measure of 
intuition, and REI’s measure of rational thinking was strongly related to PID’s measure of 
deliberation. In line with the dual process theory, the different self-report measures of 
experiential processing and analytic processing were not significant, or weakly related to each 
other. Furthermore, the CRT was significantly positively related to REI’s measure of rational 
thinking, whereas both the self-reported and performance based measures of rational thinking 
were significantly positively related to cognitive ability. 
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To examine whether the illusory truth effect is related to individual differences in 
cognitive ability, NFC and cognitive styles, we computed a difference score between truth 
judgments of repeated statements and truth judgments of new statements, with higher values 
indicating a higher illusory truth effect. These differences scores (see Table 2) as well as the 
individual difference measures (see Table 3) had a sufficient range to allow meaningful 
correlations. 
 
Table 3. Variable means, Standard Deviations (SD), Ranges, Cronbach’s α, and correlations 
of individual difference measures in Study 1-7. 
 Study 1 
Measure M (SD) Range 1 2 3 4 
1. fluid intel 18.16 (4.77) 7 -33     
2. NFC 3.47 (.65) 1.80 – 5.27 -.06 (.81)   
3. REI: exp 4.85 (.99) 1.30 – 6.90 .09 -.03 (.82)  
4. REI: rat 4.57 (.88) 2.00 – 6.90 .18*** -.07 -.01 (.89) 
   Study 2    
Measure M (SD) Range 1 2 3 4 
1. verb intel 38.35 (8.85) 8 – 49 (.94)    
Study 3 
Measure M (SD) Range 1 2 3 4 
1. PID: int 3.14 (.76) 1.00 – 5.00 (.85)    
2. PID: del 3.94 (.54) 2.22 – 5.00 -.14* (.81)   
3. REI: exp 3.17 (.81) 1.20 – 4.95 .83*** -.12* (.95)  
4. REI: rat 3.72 (.73) 1.40 – 5.00 -.13* .48*** -.05 (.94) 
Study 4 
Measure M (SD) Range 1 2 3 4 
1. PID: int 3.02 (.80) 1.11 – 5.00 (.90)    
2. PID: del 3.94 (.58) 1.44 – 5.00 -.16* (.84)   
3. REI: exp 3.20 (.59) 1.40 – 5.00 .66*** -.12 (.83)  
4. REI: rat 3.41 (.73) 1.65 – 5.00 .02 .35*** .01 (.90) 
   Study 5    
Measure M (SD) Range 1 2 3 4 
1. verb intel 38.96 (8.35) 8 – 49 (.94)    
2. CRT 4.41 (2.24) 0 – 7 .36*** (.80)   
Study 6 
Measure M (SD) Range 1 2 3 4 
1. REI: exp 4.62 (1.12) 1 – 7 (.92)    
2. REI: rat 5.18 (1.31) 1 – 7 .12* (.95)   
3. CRT 1.72 (1.22) 0 – 3 -.15** .16** (.77)  
Study 7 
Measure M (SD) Range 1 2 3 4 
1. CRT 3.44 (2.12) 0 - 7 (.77)    
Note. Fluid intel = fluid intelligence, verb intel = verbal intelligence, REI: exp = REI: 
experiential, REI: rat = REI: rationality, PID: int = PID intuition, PID: del = PID: 
deliberation. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Main analyses.  
To maximize statistical power and precision, we conducted meta-analyses on the 
obtained effects. Therefore, bivariate correlations between the various individual difference 
variables and the illusory truth effect, operationalized as differences scores, were calculated.3 
The alternative method of using Repeated Measures analyses in which the interaction is tested 
between the individual difference variables and the within-subject truth rating of repeated 
information and truth rating of new information, are statistically equivalent, yielding identical 
results (see OSF page). We chose to use and report analyses based on the difference scores, 
because these are easier to interpret, present a straightforward indication of the direction of 
the effects, and allow for straightforward meta-analyses. Figure 1 presents an overview of the 
individual results of each study, as well as frequentist meta-analytic integrations of these 
associations. 
Cognitive ability.  
A measure of fluid intelligence was included in the lab experiment (Study 1), whereas 
a measure of verbal intelligence was administered in Study 2 and Study 5. Bivariate 
correlation analyses revealed no significant associations between individual differences in 
either fluid or verbal intelligence and the effect size of the illusory truth effect (see Figure 1). 
A frequentist meta-analytic integration of both studies, using a DerSimonian-Laird approach 
with Metacor package (Laliberté, 2015) in R, provided no support for a significant association 
between general cognitive ability and the illusory truth effect (see Figure 1). In order to 
quantify the strength of evidence in favor of no relationship between cognitive ability and the 
illusory truth effect versus an association between cognitive ability and the illusory truth 
effect, a Bayesian meta-analysis was conducted with BayesFactor package (Morey, 2018) in 
                                                          
3Multiple regression coefficients with the simultaneous inclusion of all variables of each study 
yielded similar results and are available at OSF. 
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R.4 Results revealed a BFH0 of 20.97, suggesting that the data is 20.97 times more likely to 
have occurred under the null hypothesis (i.e., cognitive ability is not related to the illusory 
truth effect) than under the alternative hypothesis (i.e., bidirectional test: cognitive ability is 
related to the illusory truth effect). 
 Need for cognitive closure.  
Similar to fluid intelligence, a NFC measure was included in Study 1. Bivariate 
correlation analysis revealed no evidence for an association between NFC and the illusory 
truth effect (see Figure 1). Bayesian analysis favored the null hypothesis with a Bayes factor 
of BFH0 = 10.51. 
 Experiential processing.  
As measures of experiential processing, PID’s preference for intuition measure was 
included in Study 3 and Study 4, and the REI’s experiential thinking style measure was 
included in Studies 1, 3, 4, and 6, leading to a total of 6 tests for the association between 
experiential processing and the illusory truth effect.  
In both Study 3 and Study 4, the relationship between PID’s preference for intuition 
measure and the illusory truth effect was trivial and non-significant. The frequentist meta-
analytic integration of both studies revealed no evidence for an association between PID’s 
preference for intuition measure and the illusory truth effect (see Figure 1), and a Bayesian 
meta-analysis provided strong support for the null hypothesis; BFH0= 15.33. 
Similarly, REI’s experiential thinking style measure was not significantly related to 
the illusory truth effect in Studies 3, 4, and 6. However, in Study 1, this relationship was 
positive and significant. A frequentist meta-analysis revealed an overall non-significant 
association between REI’s experiential thinking style measure and the illusory truth effect 
                                                          
4Bayes factors were calculated on t-statistics with a scale factor of √2/2 for the cauchy prior 
(default option in BayesFactor). 
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(see Figure 1). Additionally, a Bayesian meta-analysis strongly supported the null hypothesis, 
BFH0 = 10.63.  
 Analytic processing.  
As measures of analytic processing, PID’s measure of preference for deliberation was 
included in Study 3 and Study 4, the REI’s rational thinking style measure was included in 
Studies 1, 3, 4, and 6, and the CRT was included in Studies 5-7, leading to 9 separate tests for 
an association between individual differences in analytic processing and the illusory truth 
effect.  
PID’s measure of preference for deliberation was not significantly related to the 
illusory truth effect in both Study 3 and Study 4. The frequentist meta-analysis provided no 
support for an association between PID’s measure of preference for deliberation (see Figure 
1), and Bayesian meta-analysis supported the null hypothesis, BFH0 = 6.52.  
Similarly, the REI’s rational thinking measure was not significantly related to the 
illusory truth effect in Study 1 and Study 6. However, this association was significant and 
positive in Study 3, and significant and negative in Study 4. Pooling the data, the frequentist 
meta-analysis revealed no significant association between REI’s rational measure (see Figure 
1), and the Bayesian meta-analysis indicated that the null hypothesis was much more likely 
than the alternative hypothesis, BFH0 = 21.04. 
Finally, also the associations between the behavioral measure of analytic processing, 
the CRT, and the effect size of the illusory truth effect were negligible and non-significant in 
Study 5 – 7. Consequently, the frequentist meta-analysis revealed an effect size within a 
confidence interval that included 0 (see Figure 1). Additionally, Bayesian meta-analysis 
favored the null hypothesis, BFH0 = 7.81.  
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Figure 1. Bivariate correlation coefficients (r) and 95% confidence intervals [CI] for the 
relationship between individual differences and the illusory truth effect in Study 1 – Study 7, 
and a meta-analytic integration (meta). 
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General Discussion 
The illusory truth effect, referring to people’s tendency to believe repeated information 
more compared to new information, can have a profound impact on individuals (Brown & 
Nix, 1996) and society at large (Pennycook et al. 2018). Despite the theoretical and practical 
relevance of this effect, and its long research tradition, surprisingly little is known about 
individual differences that may influence people’s susceptibility to the effect. The present 
research addressed this question, and investigated the influence of cognitive ability, need for 
closure, and cognitive thinking styles on the illusory truth effect in seven highly powered and 
systematic studies.  
Previous researched showed that these individual differences in cognition influence 
decision making and knowledge formation, and the integration of these different variables is 
in line with recent developments within the field (De keersmaecker, Bostyn, Fontaine, Van 
Hiel, & Roets, 2018; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015b; Roets et al. 2015; Stanovich 
et al., 2016). Building on this literature, the hypotheses followed that individuals with high 
levels of cognitive ability, due to better memory, and individuals high in NFC and 
experiential thinking, due to the reliance on easy cues in making judgments, would be more 
prone to the illusory truth effect, whereas individuals high in analytic thinking would be less 
inclined to judge repeated information as more true compared to new information. 
However, various studies have suggested the robustness of the illusory truth effect. 
Indeed, the effect was found among the elderly (Dechêne et al. 2010), with statements that 
were politically discordant (Pennycook et al. 2018), with statements that individuals had no 
conscious memory of (Begg et al., 1992), with statements that individuals knew to be 
incorrect (Fazio et al. 2015, Unkelbach, 2007), and even in the presence of advice regarding 
the factual truth (both at encoding: Pennycook et al. 2018, and during judgment: Unkelbach & 
Greifeneder, 2018). As such, these studies suggested that the illusory truth effect is a 
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relatively robust cognitive process, beyond the influence of cognitive ability, NFC and 
specific cognitive thinking styles. 
Across seven studies, the latter hypothesis was supported, and we found convergent 
evidence for the robustness of the illusory truth effect. In particular, in all seven studies, 
participants tended to believe repeated information more compared to new information, 
irrespective of the measured individual difference. In particular, pooling the data and using a 
meta-analytical approach, the illusory truth effect was not statistically significant related to 
individual differences in cognitive ability (Study 1, 2, 5) or NFC (Study 1), nor was it related 
to two self-report measures of experiential processing (PID’s preference for intuition: Study 3, 
4; REI’s experiential processing: Study 1, 3, 4, 6), or two self-report measures of analytic 
processing (PID’s preference for deliberation: Study 3, 4; REI’s rational processing: Study 1, 
3, 4, 6). Also a behavioral measure of analytic processing, the CRT, did not relate in a 
meaningful way to the illusory truth effect (Study 5 – 7). Moreover, (meta-analytic) Bayes 
Factors strongly favored the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis regarding the 
associations between individual differences in cognition and the illusory truth effect.  
In all studies, we relied on participants living in Western societies. Although we don’t 
have a theoretical rationale to expect that the observed findings would be moderated by 
culture or society, we are not able to empirically test this possibility. Furthermore, six of our 
studies relied on samples collected through an open online platform (Mturk), and we were not 
able to monitor these participants during their participation. Nevertheless, it has been 
repeatedly demonstrated that running experiments through such online platforms can provide 
high-quality data (e.g. Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 
2011). Study 1 was conducted in the lab, which allowed a closer monitoring of the 
participants, although it should be acknowledged that these sessions tested 35-40 participants 
simultaneously. 
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The present results contribute to the referential theory and the processing fluency 
explanation of the illusory truth effect by showing that the use of coherently linked 
corresponding references and processing fluency in truth judgments is not related to 
individual differences in cognitive ability, need for epistemic security and different thinking 
styles. In particular, these novel findings are in line with the assertion that processing fluency 
is not a judgmental bias and flaw in the individual, but rather a cue to truth that is universal 
and epistemologically justified in most contexts (Reber and Unkelbach, 2010; Unkelbach & 
Greifender, 2013). 
The consistent and strong emergence of the illusory truth effect in the present series of 
studies, and the relative lack of predictive value of individual differences in cognitive ability, 
need for epistemic security and cognitive styles, attests to the robustness of the effect. 
However, these findings do not necessarily mean that all individuals are equally prone to the 
illusory truth effect. Interesting in this regard is the work of Mitchell, Sullivan, Schacter and 
Budson (2006), who found that the illusory truth effect for unknown trivia statements is less 
pronounced for individuals with a clinical diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease, who are 
characterized by specific cognitive and memory function impairment, compared to healthy 
individuals of the same age. 
Given the importance and the strength of the illusory truth effect, we believe that a 
more advanced understanding of whether and how individual differences may moderate the 
effect is crucial. The current lack of scholarly attention to the investigation of individual 
differences in the illusory truth effect seems problematic, especially if this should be the result 
of publication bias against non-significant results. We believe that understanding which 
plausible variables do not affect the illusory truth effect, might be as informative as knowing 
which variables do influence the effect. In this regard, it is also important to understand why 
particular individual difference variables do or do not affect the overall illusory truth effect. 
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Indeed, it may be possible that a particular variable has different effects on different aspects 
that are relevant for the illusory truth effect. For example, greater cognitive ability might 
increase the experience of fluency due to superior memory, while having a negative effect on 
the reliance of fluency on judgments of truth. Although speculative at this point, testing such 
possibilities in adapted, more intricate experimental designs can provide further insight, not 
only into the role of individual differences, but also into the mechanics behind the truth effect. 
Another interesting avenue for future research would be to focus on individual differences 
that tap into implicit levels of cognition, such as implicit learning. The present series of 
studies focused on intelligence, epistemic needs, and cognitive styles. However, as argued by 
Kaufman et al (2010), relative to explicit cognition, individual differences in implicit 
cognition, is a neglected, but potentially fruitful line of research for understanding human 
complex cognition, and might also further advance our understanding of how the truth effect 
operates.  
Conclusion 
In line with previous work, we found that individuals tend to believe repeated 
information more compared to new information. Across seven studies, this tendency was not 
reliably and substantially related to cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, experiential 
thinking, and both self-reported and performance based measures of analytic thinking.  
The absence of an association between these key individual difference variables in judgment 
and decision making and the illusory truth effect is theoretically intriguing, and raises the 
question about which alternative factors may underlie the observed variance of the illusory 
truth effect. Given the ease by which repetition can influence the perceived truth, and the 
potential power of misinformation, we hope that the present contribution will inspire other 
scholars to further examine the potential role of individual differences in the illusory truth 
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effect, and we especially encourage them to also publish non-significant findings since the 
added value of these ‘non-relationships’ are highly underestimated in the literature. 
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